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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Arthur Richmond appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated 
assault. He asserts that the district court committed fundamental error by reducing the 
State's burden of proof in instructing the jury on self defense and that the district court 
erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the court erred by failing to give a 
unanimity instruction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Richmond was charged with aggravated assault against his fiance, Michelle 
Williams, "by punching her in the head and/or face causing severe swelling and bruising 
to her eyes and face, and bleeding to her nose and/or by grabbing her by the neck and 
applying pressure." (R., p.25.) Ms. Williams testified that Mr. Richmond was her ex-
fiance and that at the time of the incident in this case had been dating Mr. Richmond for 
about eight months. (Tr. Vol. I, p.156, Ls.4-24.) She testified that on March 10, 2012, 
Mr. Richmond's vehicle had broken down and needed a new starter; they were in 
Garden City across from the Ranch Club. Mr. Richmond's mother came to help but 
they could not get the vehicle to start. Eventually they jump-started the car. Once 
Mr. Richmond's mother left, Ms. Williams and Mr. Richmond "starting arguing about him 
blaming me for him staying here." (Tr. Vol. I, p.158, Ls.1-9.) Mr. Richmond wanted to 
move away, and, according to Ms. Williams, he blamed her for him staying in Idaho. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.158, Ls.24-25.) 
Once the car was jump-started, Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams drove toward 
Mr. Richmond's mother's house in Meridian. (Tr. Vol. I, p.158, Ls.14-15.) According to 
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Ms. Williams, during the drive, Mr. Richmond was yelling at her about keeping him in 
Idaho and was calling her names. (Tr. Vol. I, p.159, Ls.7-12.) Ms. Williams testified that 
at this point Mr. Richmond hit her on the side of her head, causing her head to hit the 
windshield. (Tr. Vol. I, p.160, Ls.12-18.) He continued to punch her in the eyes and the 
nose. (Tr. Vol. I, p.160 Ls.20-23.) 
At this point, Ms. Williams stated that she went in and out of consciousness. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.161, Ls.1-2.) She denied ever trying to hit him back or scratch 
Mr. Richmond. (Tr. Vol. I, p.161, Ls.19-23.) Eventually, according to Ms. Williams, 
Mr. Richmond took the seat belt choked her with it. (Tr. Vol. I, p.162, Ls.19-23.) 
Ms. Williams testified that she lost consciousness after Mr. Richmond choked her. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.163, Ls.20-21.) However, she told the responding paramedic that she 
never lost consciousness. (Tr. Vol. I, p.211, Ls.9-11.) 
Mr. Richmond eventually stopped the vehicle at the residence, where, according 
to Ms. Williams, Mr. Richmond "pulled me out and ripped my shirt and my sweatshirt 
andmybracompletelyoffme." (Tr. Vol. I, p.164, Ls.13-16.) 
At this point Ms. Williams went to a neighbor's house and asked them to drive 
her to a bar because her friends were there. (Tr. Vol. I, p.165, Ls.13-19.) She had a 
shot of whiskey and a beer at the bar and then went to two other bars. (Tr. Vol. I, p.166, 
Ls.8-23.) She had also been drinking prior to the drive from Garden City to Meridian. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.169, Ls.2-7.) A bartender called the police after Ms. Williams asked her to. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.167, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Williams did not call the police because she loved 
Mr. Richmond and did not want him to get in trouble. (Tr. Vol. I, p.167, Ls.11-18.) She 
never went to the hospital or saw a doctor. (Tr. Vol. I, p.191, Ls.18-22.) 
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Mr. Richmond testified and denied that he and Ms. Williams had fought about 
him staying in Idaho; Mr. Richmond testified that he found employment in San Diego 
and that Ms. Williams "was more than prepared to go." (Tr. Vol. I, p.264, Ls.2-8.) 
According to Mr. Richmond, things started to go "downhill" shortly after they crossed the 
intersection of Eagle and Chinden. (Tr. Vol. I, p.272, Ls.6-11.) Ms. Williams began to 
discuss how upset she was that she was leaving her family, but she was also talking 
about her father because she had had a bad dream the night before. (Tr. Vol. I, p.272, 
Ls.8-16.) Her father had molested her as a child. (Tr. Vol. I, p.159, Ls.10-12.) 
Ms. Williams seemed to be working herself up a bit and Mr. Richmond thought that 
perhaps she had too much to drink. (Tr. Vol. I, p.274, Ls.2-9.) He also was not sure 
that she had taken her PTSD medicine and he knew she was prone to temper tantrums 
when she forgets to take the medicine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.274, Ls.10-25.) 
Ms. Williams began getting upset with Mr. Richmond because she did not think 
he was paying attention or taking her seriously. (Tr. Vol. I, p.275, Ls.9-19.) She then hit 
Mr. Richmond in the arm, but not very hard. (Tr. Vol. I, p.278, Ls.2-15.) Mr. Richmond 
testified that at this point they stopped at a friends' house because Ms. Williams wanted 
marijuana. (Tr. Vol. I, p.278, Ls.14-25.) However, the friend was not at home and 
Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams continued toward Meridian. (Tr. Vol. I, p.279, Ls.2-5.) 
After Mr. Richmond merged into traffic, Ms. Williams punched him on the side of his 
head and insisted that they go back to the friend's house and try again. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.280, L.20 - p.281, L.5.) Mr. Richmond refused and Ms. Williams then punched him 
again, causing his head to snap back and his glasses to fall off. (Tr. Vol. I, p.281, 
Ls.14-24.) He realized at this point that the vehicle was moving into oncoming traffic 
and he was stunned. (Tr. Vol. I, p.282, Ls.6-25.) 
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At this point, Mr. Richmond pulled the vehicle over and told Ms. Williams to exit. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p.283, Ls.3-17.) She refused to exit but promised to calm down. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.284, Ls.2-15.) Shortly thereafter, however, she "reached out and she grabbed me by 
my shirt sleeve and pulled me forward and she started pummeling me. She started 
hitting me on the side of the head and face, and I was putting my hand up to block her 
from hitting me." (Tr. Vol. I, p.286, Ls.14-21.) Mr. Richmond realized he was then 
driving in a construction area and then into oncoming traffic, so, "there was nothing else 
that I could do at that particular point, so I started to fight back." (Tr. Vol. I., p.287, Ls.1-
15.) 
Mr. Richmond testified that he "reverse punched her, and "we were kind of 
swinging wildly back and forth." (Tr. Vol. I, p.287, Ls.17-25.) Mr. Richmond stated that 
the struggle only lasted a few seconds and that, after landing a couple of punches, he 
felt Ms. Williams stop punching him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.288, Ls.22-25.) 
At this point, he used, "an up-and-under move", where, "I went over her shoulder 
and went under her elbow and grabbed her by her sweatshirt and pushed her sweatshirt 
back over as I was leaning on the car this way pushing her back into the seat." (Tr. Vol. 
I, p.289, Ls.5-11.) Ms. Williams continued to push forward toward him and he continued 
to push back; they continued pushing each other until Mr. Richmond pulled into the 
driveway, where he told Ms. Williams he was going to let her go. (Tr. Vol. I, p.291, Ls.1-
19.) He let her go and jumped out of the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.291, Ls.16-25.) 
Afterward, Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams spoke for about 10-15 minutes; he 
noticed that her nose was bleeding and her eye was swelling. (Tr. Vol. I, p.292, Ls.8-
25.) At this point it dawned on Mr. Richmond that Ms. Williams had forgotten to take her 
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medication and thought that this might explain her behavior. (Tr. Vol. I, p.292, L.17 
p.293, L.4.) 
Mr. Richmond felt awful about what happened. (Tr. Vol. I, p.293, Ls.4-7.) He 
testified that he did not feel in imminent danger of bodily harm the first time that 
Ms. Williams began hitting him but did the second time - "I thought that we could 
probably get into a really bad accident at that point when I saw the car corning toward 
us." (Tr. Vol. I, p.293, Ls.15-19.) He believed that his actions were necessary to 
prevent the two of them from crashing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.294, Ls.1-7.) 
Mr. Richmond's defense at trial was therefore self-defense. While the district 
court properly instructed the jury that, "the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Richmond's actions were not justifiable, it incorrectly 
informed the jury that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he was in "imminent 
danger of death or great bodily injury." (R., pp. 95-96; Tr. Vol. II, p.38, L.7 - p.39, L.8.) 
The jury should have been instructed that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he 
was in danger only of bodily injury. 
Mr. Richmond was found guilty of aggravated assault. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.90, Ls.21-
25.) He subsequently pleaded guilty to a persistent violator enhancement. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.96, Ls.13-23.) He then filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the district court 
erred by failing to provide a unanimity instruction, because, "what we have was those 
two separate acts alleged by the state. And it was not - the jury did not decide which 
act was done in order to support the conviction of aggravated assault." ((R., p.112; 
Tr. Vol. I, p.316, Ls.7-12.) The district court denied the motion for a new trial and then 
imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.127; 137.) 
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Pursuant to a petition for post-conviction relief, the district court vacated the initial 
judgment and reentered the judgment for the purpose of allowing Mr. Richmond to 
appeal. (R., p.150.) Mr. Richmond then appealed. (R., p.152.) He asserts that the 
district court committed fundamental error by reducing the State's burden of proof in 
instructing the jury on self defense and that the district court erred by denying his motion 
for a new trial because the court erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court commit fundamental error my misdirecting the jury on self-
defense? 
2. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Richmond's motion for a new trial 
because the court should have given a unanimity instruction? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Misdirecting The Jury On Self-
Defense 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Richmond asserts that the district court committed fundamental error by 
incorrectly informing the jury that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he was in 
"imminent danger of death or great bodily injury." Because he was only required to 
demonstrate a fear of bodily injury, the district court erred, and this error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings. 
B. The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Misdirecting The Jury On 
Self-Defense 
Mr. Richmond's defense at trial was self-defense. While the district court 
properly instructed the jury that, "the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that Mr. Richmond's actions were not justifiable, it incorrectly 
informed the jury that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he was in "imminent 
danger of death or great bodily injury." (R., pp. 95-96; Tr. Vol. II, p.38, L.7 - p.39, L.8.) 
The jury should have been instructed that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he 
was in danger only of bodily injury. 
Mr. Richmond acknowledges that he did not object to the self defense 
instructions at trial. "Idaho decisional law, however, has long allowed appellate courts 
to consider a claim of error to which no objection was made below if the issue presented 
rises to the level of fundamental error." State v. Velasco, 154 Idaho 534, 536-37 
(Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007)). Pursuant to State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010), if an alleged error was not followed by a 
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contemporaneous objection, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged error ( 1) 
violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists 
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) 
was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained-of 
error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court must vacate and 
remand. Id. 
The first prong of Perry is satisfied because the requirement that the State prove 
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional 
guarantee of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); State v. 
Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47 (Ct. App. 2000). 
This standard of proof "plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure" 
because it "provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-that 
bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation 
of the administration of our criminal law.' " In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) 
(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). 
An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element 
of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process, State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576,588 (2011); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007); see 
also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); or as a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment's jury trial guarantee. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); 
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78. See also State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 
2012). 
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In Idaho, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, 
"[w]e are aware that all but two of the States, Ohio and South Carolina, have 
abandoned the common-law rule and require the prosecution to prove the absence of 
self-defense when it is properly raised by the defendant." Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 
236 (1987). The Criminal Jury Instruction also clearly places the burden on the State. 
See ICJI 1517. While the Martin Court ruled that the states were not constitutionally 
required to make the State meet this burden, it is clear that Idaho has chosen to place 
the burden on the State. This burden cannot be lowered without violating 
Mr. Richmond's due process and Sixth Amendment rights. Because disproving the fear 
of any bodily injury is more difficult than disproving fear of imminent death or great 
bodily injury, the instruction misstated the State's burden of proof. Thus, because the 
error implicates Mr. Richmond's right to due process, the first prong of Perry is satisfied. 
The error also plainly exists. Mr. Richmond submits that while the district court 
properly instructed the jury that, "the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that Mr. Richmond's actions were not justifiable, it incorrectly 
informed the jury that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he was in "imminent 
danger of death or great bodily injury." (R., pp. 95-96; Tr. Vol. 11, p.38, L.7 - p.39, L.8.) 
The jury should have been instructed that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he 
was in danger only of bodily injury. The jury instructions in the record plainly require 
Mr. Richmond to demonstrate that he was in "imminent danger of death or great bodily 
injury." (R., pp.95-96.) This is also plainly wrong. The Court of Appeals has explained: 
The right to defend oneself from attack is embodied in several Idaho 
statutes. Idaho Code § 19-201 provides that "lawful resistance to the 
commission of a public offense may be made: (1) By the party about to be 
injured"; and § 19-202 specifies that "[r]esistance sufficient to prevent the 
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offense may be made by the party about to be injured: (1) to prevent an 
offense against his person .... " Section 19-202A further provides that "[n]o 
person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind 
whatsoever for protecting himself ... by reasonable means necessary .... "5 
These statutes do not require that the defendant believe himself to be in 
danger of great bodily injury in order to assert self-defense as justification 
for a battery. 
The Idaho Supreme Court considered whether fear of great bodily injury is 
necessary in State v. Woodward, 58 Idaho 385 (1937). At issue there was 
the propriety of a self-defense instruction given in a trial for assault with a 
deadly weapon. The trial court had instructed the jury that self-
defense would justify the assault only if the defendant's act was 
"necessary to prevent the infliction upon him of great bodily injury." 
The Supreme Court held that, although the instruction would be 
correct if the defendant were being tried for a homicide, it was 
erroneous in a prosecution for aggravated assault. The Court stated, 
"A person who is assaulted or interfered with by another without 
provocation may use sufficient force to repel the attack without being guilty 
of assault even though he may not believe himself to be in danger of 
grievous bodily harm." Id. at 392 (quoting People v. Lopez, 238 App. Div. 
619,265 N.Y.S. 211,213 (1933)). 
State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328-29 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added). The law is 
thus clear that in a prosecution for aggravated assault, like Mr. Richmond's case, a 
defendant need only be in danger of any bodily injury. The second prong of Perry is 
therefore satisfied. 
Regarding the third prong of the Perry test, there is a reasonable probability that 
the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Mr. Richmond's sole defense in 
this case was self-defense. He testified that Ms. Williams became irate and began 
punching him and he responded by punching her back in order to make her stop. He 
also testified that she pushed herself into him, causing him to lose control of the vehicle 
for a time and causing him to move into oncoming traffic. It was in response to this 
pushing that Mr. Richmond used the "up and over" move, which Ms. Williams described 
as using the seatbelt to strangle her. 
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The jury instruction required a finding that Mr. Richmond fear an imminent 
danger of death or great bodily injury. (R., pp.95-96.) However, a finding of simple 
bodily injury was sufficient. In this case, the jury could have easily concluded that 
Ms. Williams' conduct did not create a fear of imminent danger of death or great bodily 
injury, but could have concluded that the simple act of either punching or pushing 
Mr. Richmond placed him in fear of any bodily injury. 
"[W'here the jury instructions were ... partially erroneous . . . the appellate 
court may apply the harmless error test, and where the evidence supporting a finding on 
the omitted element is overwhelming and uncontroverted, so that no rational jury could 
have found that the state failed to prove that element, the constitutional violation may be 
deemed harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224. Mr. Richmond's fear of harm was hardly 
uncontested - it was his defense. The jury could have concluded that Mr. Richmond 
feared bodily injury but not imminent danger of death or great bodily injury and still 
convicted him of aggravated assault. This was error. And because this error goes to 
the heart of Mr. Richmond's defense and the jury could have concluded that 
Ms. Williams' behavior placed Mr. Richmond in fear of bodily injury, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
11. 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Richmond's Motion For A New Trial Because 
The District Court Should Have Given A Unanimity Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Jurors in Idaho must unanimously agree on a guilty verdict. Under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the district court was required to instruct the jurors that they 
must unanimously agree on which of the alleged assaults constituted the charged 
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offense. The district court erred by denying Mr. Richmond's motion for a new trial on 
this basis. 
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Richmond's Motion For A New Trial 
Because The District Court Should Have Given A Unanimity Instruction 
Mr. Richmond raised this issue in his motion for a new trial. (R., p.112.) He 
brought his motion pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(5), which provides: 
When a verdict has been rendered against the defendant the court may, 
upon his application, grant a new trial in the following cases only: 
[ ... ] 
5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter or law, or has erred 
in the decision of any question of law arising during the court of the trial. 
1.C. § 19-2406(5). 
Jurors must be instructed on all of the matters of law necessary for their 
consideration, including "instructions on rules of law that are 'material to the 
determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence."' State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132 and quoting State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483 
(Ct. App. 1999)). Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct the jury that they must 
unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt in order for the defendant to be convicted. 
Id. at 711 (citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267-268 (Ct. App. 2000).) However, "An 
instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense 
... is generally not required." Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 
13, 19 (1999); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991).) Nevertheless, due process 
bars states from convicting a person for a violation of a generic category of "crime" 
based upon any combination of facts the state sees fit to allege. Schad, at 633. As 
Justice Scalia has observed, "We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging 
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that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday." Id. at 651 
(Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.) 
In Severson, the defendant was alleged to have murdered his wife by alternative 
means - either by suffocating her or by poisoning her. Severson, at 701. The 
defendant argued that the district court was required to instruct the jury that they must 
be unanimous in determining the means by which he allegedly committed the murder. 
Id. at 710. In rejecting Severson's argument, the Idaho Supreme Court found "the trial 
court in this case was not required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on 
the means by which Severson killed his wife" because he "was charged with the single 
act of murdering his wife." Id. at 712. Furthermore, the Court reasoned, 
Although the evidence showed that Severson could have murdered his 
wife by either overdosing her or suffocating her, it did not indicate that 
separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus 
occurred. The very nature of the crime of murder eliminates this 
possibility. Absent evidence of more than one instance in which Severson 
engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to unanimously 
agree on the facts giving rise to the offense. 
Id. The Court recognized that the defendant could not be convicted of the single charge 
of murdering his wife on more than one occasion; thus, the district court did not err by 
failing to give a unanimity instruction. Id. 
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized that a unanimity instructions is 
necessary where separate crimes, requiring proof of distinct unions of mens rea and 
actus reus, are alleged, even where the separate crimes are alleged in one count. The 
ultimate question is whether each alleged incident was part of a single course of 
conduct. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414 (1986). As the Major Court noted, the 
distinct between whether a course of conduct constitutes one or multiple offense is 
important as, 
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to charge a defendant with two offenses when only one was committed 
violates the defendant's right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const. amend. 
V, Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with 
one offense when more than one was committed can prejudice the 
defendant "in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a 
conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate 
offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the 
defendant to double jeopardy." Criminal Procedure,§ 19.2(e), p.457. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of appeals held 
that the "act or acts" language contained in Idaho Code§ 18-1508 ("Lewd conduct with 
a minor child under sixteen"), does not "allow for a continuing course of conduct 
element. Rather, the legislature's use of the plural is a recognition that a series of 
sexual contacts by different means which occur as a part of a single incident, i.e., a 
continuous transaction without significant breaks, are to be charged as a single 
count of lewd conduct." Id. at 266 (emphasis added). Based upon the evidence 
presented at trial, the Miller Court found that the defendant was alleged to have 
committed six separate acts of manual to genital contact and that trial counsel was 
deficient in failing to request a unanimity instruction (although the court found there was 
no prejudice). Id. at 267-269. 
Furthermore, in State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33-34 (1997), the Idaho Supreme 
Court rejected the defendant's argument that his double jeopardy rights were violated 
based upon his being charged with and convicted of both lewd conduct and infamous 
crime against nature, as each act of fellatio performed on the victim were separate and 
distinct. The Court found, 
The first sexual assault took place on J.S.'s bed. The second assault took 
place on J.S.'s couch. The amended information clearly required proof of 
these different facts. Further, other events occurred in between these acts 
of sexual assault. After the first assault, J.S. was pulled off the bed and 
thrown onto the couch where Bush told J.S. he wanted J.S. to engage in 
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fellatio. J.S. refused and was pushed to his knees and Bush tied a t-shirt 
around J.S.'s face. Bush again placed J.S. on the couch and tied his arms 
behind his back with a cord. It was after these events that the second act 
of sexual assault occurred. Bush then again placed J.S.'s penis in his 
mouth for five to ten minutes. These facts appear to demonstrate that 
there were two separate and distinct sexual assaults committed on J.S. 
Id. at 34. Similarly, in State v. Grinolds, 121 Idaho 673 ( 1992), the Court found no 
double jeopardy violation where the defendant was convicted of two counts of rape, as 
the evidence showed that despite the fact that each act occurred in the same bedroom, 
the defendant left the bedroom between each act and jury was properly instructed they 
had to consider each alleged act separately. Id. at 675 
Thus, while Idaho law does not generally require jury unanimity of the underlying 
facts supporting an element of the crime, where one crime is alleged to have been 
committed by alternative means and where the defendant is alleged to have committed 
separate and distinct criminal acts, Idaho law requires unanimity even if the acts are 
alleged in a single count. 
In denying Mr. Richmond's motion for a new trial, the district court held, 
[t]he present case is an alternative means case. The evidence at trial was 
of a single, ongoing incident. Whether one accepts the Defendant's 
narrative or the victim's narrative, the crime here took place with the 
Defendant [at] first hitting, then choking the victim. Either the hitting or the 
choking could have been the basis for the jury's verdict. But there merely 
constitute the means of the commission of the crime. There was one 
continuous course of conduct. 
(R., p.131.) Mr. Richmond respectfully asserts that the district court erred. While there 
is no doubt that the all of the events occurred in the vehicle on the way from Garden 
City to Meridian, Mr. Richmond specifically testified to distinct acts. He testified that 
first, Ms. Williams punched him and he punched her in return. He testified that after 
landing a couple of punches, Ms. Williams stopped. This is one distinct event involving 
a particular type of force by both Ms. Williams and Mr. Richmond. However, after 
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stopping this behavior, Ms. Williams then began to push herself onto Mr. Richmond, and 
he responded by using the "up and under" move. This is a separate event involving a 
different type of force by both Ms. Williams and Mr. Richmond. And this is critical in a 
case like this that involves self-defense, because, based on the fact that Ms. Williams 
used two different types of force, the jury was required to determine which if any acts by 
Mr. Richmond were reasonable in response to that force. 
Thus, unlike the charge in Severson (or in State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970 
(2008) (unanimity not required as to whether the defendant committed the murder 
herself or aided and abetted another) and State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 (2010) 
(unanimity not required in determining which of the parties to an alleged conspiracy 
committed which act in furtherance of the conspiracy)), Mr. Richmond was essentially 
alleged to have committed multiple assaults - punching and strangling. He defended 
each of these alleged assaults by asserting that he was acting in self-defense. Thus, 
while some jurors may have found that Mr. Richmond committed an assault by 
punching, other may have found that the assault was committed by grabbing 
Ms. Williams' neck (or the use of the "up and over" move) and others may have found 
that one of Mr. Richmond's actions was justifiable in response to one of Ms. Williams' 
actions. 
Mr. Richmond acknowledges the Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v. 
Moffatt, 154 Idaho 529 (Ct. App. 2013), in which the court stated, 
an attempt to separate Moffat's grabbing of his girlfriend's hair and 
throwing her around the room and into objects and pushing her to the 
ground from grabbing her throat during the same dispute is an 
impermissible attempt ... to divide a single crime into a series of temporal 
or spatial units to avoid double jeopardy limitations. 
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Id. at 534, 300 P.3d at 66. Mr. Richmond asserts that his case is different because if 
the jury believed his account of the incident, Ms. Williams stopped punching him after 
he landed a couple of punches. At this point, Mr. Richmond stopped punching in self-
defense. Then, however, Ms. Williams applied a different type of force, and 
Mr. Richmond responded with a different type of self-defense. Thus, while this all may 
have occurred during one car ride, there is separate and distinct conduct by 
Ms. Williams, which, if the jury believed Mr. Richmond, led to separate and distinct acts 
of self-defense by Mr. Richmond. Therefore, the district court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury that they must be unanimous in their determination of which assault 
Mr. Richmond was guilty and erred by denying his motion for a new trial on this basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Richmond requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014. 
.C TIS 
tate Appellate Public Defender 
18 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of January, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
ROBERT ARTHUR RICHMOND 
INMATE #104750 
ICC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE ID 83707 
RICHARD D GREENWOOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
THERESA A MARTIN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
JMC/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
19 
